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Abstract—Task scheduling and resource allocation are the
crucial issues in any large scale distributed system, such
as Computational Grids (CGs). However, traditional com-
putational models and resolution methods cannot effectively
tackle the complex nature of Grid, where the resources and
users belong to many administrative domains with their own
access policies, users’ privileges, etc. Recently, researchers
are investigating the use of game theoretic approaches for
modelling task and resource allocation problems in CGs. In
this paper, we present a compact survey of the most relevant
research proposals in the literature to use game-based models
for the resource allocation problems and their resolution
using metaheuristic methods. We emphasize the need of the
translation of the traditional economical models into the game
scenarios and the use of metaheuristic schedulers for solving
such games in order to address the new complex scheduling
and allocation criterions. We study the case of asymmetric
Stackelberg game used for modelling the Grid users’ behavior,
where the security and reliability criterions are aggregated and
defined as the users’ costs functions. The obtained results show
the efficiency of the hybridization of heuristic-based approaches
with game models, which enables to include additional require-
ments and features into the computational models and tackle
more effectively the resolution of the applied schedulers.
Keywords-Computational Grid, Scheduling, Non-cooperative
Games, User behavior, Security, Meta-heuristic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Grid Computing systems have become popular for the
resolution of large-scale complex problems from science,
engineering, finance, etc. Task scheduling and resource al-
location are the crucial issues in Computational Grids (CGs).
These issues are commonly investigated using traditional
computational models and resolution methods that yield to
near-optimal allocation strategies. One drawback of such
approaches is that they cannot effectively tackle the complex
nature of CGs. On one hand, such systems account for many
administrative domains with their own access policies, user
privileges, etc. On the other hand, CGs have a hierarchical
nature and therefore any computational model should be
able to effectively express the hierarchical architecture to the
optimization model. Market and heuristic-based approaches
usually partially cover the needs of the Grid-enabled appli-
cations. Recently, researchers are investigating the use of
game theoretic approaches for modelling task and resource
allocation problems in CGs.
The aim of this paper is to present a compact survey of
the most relevant research proposals in the literature to use
game-based models for the resource allocation problems and
their resolution using meta-heuristic methods. Differently
from the other comprehensive surveys (see e.g. [Buyya,
2009]) we focus mainly on the hybridization of market-
and heuristic-based approaches with game models, which
enables to include more requirements and features into
the computational models and tackle more effectively the
resolution of the applied schedulers. We study the case of
asymmetric Stackelberg game used for modelling the Grid
users’ behavior, where the security and reliability criterions
are aggregated into the scheduling cost functions specified
for the users.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Sec. II we introduce preliminary concepts on Grid ar-
chitecture, scheduling and resource allocation and game-
theoretical models. In Sec. III we briefly survey most
relevant research proposals in the literature for using game
theoretic models for allocation problems. Then, in Sec. IV,
we present some recent findings on using of game theoretic
models for modelling allocation problems and their reso-
lution using meta-heuristics. A case study on Stackelberg
game applied to independent batch scheduling is presented
in Sec. V. We end the paper in Section VI with some
conclusions and indications for future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Models and Architectures of Computational Grids
Because of the large ultimate scale of a CG, one of
the most important issues is to design its appropriate ar-
chitectural model, which allows an efficient management
of the geographically distributed resources. Depending on
the component organization, scheduling and resource man-
agement systems are usually classified into three different
types, namely centralized, decentralized and hierarchical
Grid models.
2010 International Conference on P2P, Parallel, Grid, Cloud and Internet Computing
978-0-7695-4237-9/10 $26.00 © 2010 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/3PGCIC.2010.39
235
Figure 1. The model of secure-assured Grid.
In centralized model, there is a central authority, who has a
complete knowledge of the system. The main disadvantages
of this model are the limited scalability, lack of fault-
tolerance, and the difficulty in accommodating local multiple
policies imposed by the resource owners.
In decentralized model, local schedulers interact with each
other to manage the tasks pool. In this model, there is no
central authority responsible for resource allocation. Hence,
the model naturally addresses issues such as fault-tolerance,
scalability, site-autonomy, and multi-policy scheduling.
Finally, in the hierarchical model, there is a central meta-
scheduler (or meta-broker), which interacts with local job
dispatchers in order to define the optimal schedules. The
local schedulers have knowledge about resource clusters, but
they cannot monitor the whole system. The hierarchy in such
a system usually consists of two or three levels.
An example of the hierarchical bi-level Grid is the Meta-
Broker model (MB. In this model, Grid users submit their
tasks/applications to the meta-broker, who uses also the
information supplied by the resource owners to match the
users’ tasks/applications to appropriate resources.
Kwok et al. [Kwok et al., 2007] presented a hierarchical
Grid model with three main levels: the global, the inter-site
and the intra-site levels. At the intra-site level, there is a
federation of autonomous machines. The resource owners
send an information about the computational capacities of
the machines to the local job dispatcher, which defines
the “Grid site reputation index” and send it to the global
scheduler, who performs the tasks scheduling according to
a certain scheduling algorithm.
Recently, Kolodziej and Xhafa [Kołodziej et al., 2010]
proposed an extension of the meta-broker model to define
the security-assured grid site (see Fig. 1). In that approach
the meta-broker plays additionally the role of the trust
manager, which is responsible for the verification of the
secure-assurance condition for any task-machine matching.
All examples of the hierarchical systems presented above
can be easily translated into the game models in order to
push the concept of CG into mainstream computing (market-
based approaches) and to address the new requirements in
Grid scheduling.
B. Scheduling and Resource Allocation in Computational
Grids
Unlike traditional distributed systems, in CGs the users
and distributed resource clusters work in different au-
tonomous domains. Whereas Grid users require assurance
on the level, type, and quality of service being provided by
the resources, resource owners are usually concerned about
maintaining the local control on how resources are being
utilized. Thus, an effective mapping of computational tasks
or data transfers to resources that meet the requirements
(cost, performance, security and other service metrics) re-
mains challenging.
Due to different demands imposed by Grid-enabled ap-
plications, scheduling can be defined as a family of global
optimization problems. Its complexity comes from the num-
ber of objectives to optimize (single vs. multi-objective), the
type of the environment (static vs. dynamic), the processing
mode (immediate vs. batch), tasks interrelations, etc.
Among several types of scheduling problems, Independent
Job Batch Scheduling is one of the simplest and fundamental
scheduling problem version. It usually arises in data inten-
sive computing such as data mining and massive processing
applications. For this class of Grid-enabled applications,
batch mode is appropriate task processing mode. In such
a case, jobs or applications are grouped in batches and
scheduled as a group.
The independent scheduling problem can be formal-
ized using the Expected Time To Compute (ETC) matrix
model [Ali et al., 2000]. In this model the following input
data has to be specified:
• A number of independent tasks to be allocated to Grid
resources in non-preemptive mode.
• A number of machines candidates to participate in the
allocation of tasks.
• The workload (in millions of instructions) of each task.
• The computing capacity of each machine (in Mips).
• The ready times indicating when machines will have
finished the previously assigned tasks.
• The ETC matrix of size nb tasks × nb machines,
where ETC[j][m] is the value of the expected time
to compute task j in machine m.
C. Game theory based scheduling and resource manage-
ment models
Game theory is playing an important role in computer
science, where it is being used as a means for modelling
interactive computations or multi-agent systems. Recently,
Internet computing is a new domain of applications of game
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theory, which in combination with economic theory can
develop algorithms for finding equilibria in computational
markets, computational auctions, Grid and P2P systems and
secure information transfers.
There are three main types of game scenarios applied in
CGs:
• Non-cooperative game: In this game, players act in-
dependently of each other. This model is based on the
premise about the users’ behavior in a realistic Grid,
in which cooperation is difficult to happen at large
scale. Grid users usually submit their tasks/applications
to the Grid system independently of each other. Also,
the resource owners act selfishly in order to maximize
the resource utilization.
• Cooperative game: In this game scenario, players can
form a coalition to plan in advance their actions. This
model is useful for the intra-site Grid negotiations,
where the local job dispatchers can define the joint
“execution capabilities” parameters for the clusters of
the Grid sites and declare them to the global scheduler.
• Semi-cooperative game: In this model, any player can
choose (randomly) another player for cooperation. This
game is usually proposed as a multi-round auction to
incorporate the task rescheduling.
In the following two sections (Sec. III, Sec. IV) we present
some well-known and recently proposed examples of Grid
models, on which the above game scenarios are supported.
III. GAME-THEORETICAL MODELS AND
MARKET-BASED APPROACHES
A. Market-based Approaches
Computational economy is one of the most popular mech-
anism for the design of resource management architecture
of Grid systems. It allows the Grid resource owners, acting
as sellers, to earn money by letting others (mainly the
Grid users, acting as buyers) use their (idle) computational
resources. The pricing of resources is driven by demand and
supply.
A number of economic models for Grid resource man-
agement has been proposed in the literature. We highlight
in Table I three most popular approaches in Grid Computing,
namely commodity market, auction and bargaining models.
Each model can be easily modified to meet the Grid users’
or resource owners’ specified requirements. For example,
the Posted Price Model [Buyya, 2009] is an extension of
commodity market by considering posted prices (usually
lower than regular ones) as a special offer to the Grid users.
The auction mechanism can be also defined in many ways
(e.g. English, Dutch, Second Price auctions). All of them
differ in terms of whether they are performed as open or
closed auctions and the offer price for the highest bidder.
Wolski et al. [Wolski et al., 2001] proposed a model called
G-Commerce in which computational resources among dif-
ferent Grid sites are traded in a barter manner. This model
can be interpreted as a combination of the commodity
market and auction approaches. A comprehensive survey
on traditional market-based models is presented in [Buyya,
2009].
B. Hybridization of Game Models and Market-based Ap-
proaches
Market-oriented approaches are suitable to exploit the in-
teraction of different scheduling layers. However, Grid users
and resource owners are likely to behave in different (selfish
or/and cooperative) manners and their behavior cannot be
characterized using conventional techniques. Game models
are quite natural tools for solving this problem, because each
market-based scenario can be easily translated into the game
framework.
The mechanism of first price bidding auctions was applied
by Kwok et al. [Kwok et al., 2007] to define the game-based
resource management and global scheduling policy at the
intra- and inter-site levels in the 3-levels hierarchical Grid
structure. In the intra-site bidding each machine owner in the
site declares the “execution capability” of the resource. The
local job dispatcher moderates these amounts and sends a
single value to the global scheduler. In the inter-site bidding
the global scheduler should allocate tasks according to the
values sent by the local dispatchers. The authors showed
that the cooperation of the players at both levels are the
optimal strategies for both games. In fact there is also a
third game defined for the resource owners, who behave
selfishly. The objective of this non-cooperative game is to
maximize the resource utilization. The game scenarios at
each level are very simple and the authors focused in fact
on the optimization of two scheduling criteria: minimization
of the task deadlines (user’s requirement) and maximization
of the resource utilization (resource owner’s requirement).
However, for the successful execution of all those games
some synchronization mechanism must be introduced, which
can make the whole system inefficient in a large-scale
dynamic environment.
An early approach of modified auction mechanisms can be
found in [Regev et al., 1998]. The authors defined POPCORN
market for trading online CPU times. In their system, a
virtual currency called “popcoin” was used between buyers
and sellers communicating via internet. The social efficiency
and price stability were studied using the Vickrey auction
game. In this scenario cooperation between players to form
a coalition and win the auction, is possible, but usually the
players behave selfishly.
Ghosh et al. [Ghosh et al., 2004] study the load balancing
issues in a mobile CG, in which there is a wireless access
point (WAP) which mediates the requests from different
mobile devices. The problem is modeled as a bargaining
cooperative game between each mobile device and the WAP
server. The solution of the whole game is the Nash Bargain-
ing Solution (NBS). In this approach an explicit payment
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Table I
MARKET-BASED MODELS FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN COMPUTATIONAL GRIDS
Model Characteristic Optimization criteria Grid architecture model Main References
Commodity Market - pricing policies are based onthe demand from the users and
the supply of resources,
- minimizing the cost of the
resource utilization (paid by the
user under budget constraints)
and the overall task execution
time
Meta-Broker [Garg et al., 2009]
[Buyya et al. 2002]
Auctions
- offering buying and selling
items for bids
- minimizing the highest bidder
price (first price auction)
- All hierarchical models [Ghosh et al., 2004]
- managing the bids (auction-
eers)
- maximizing the resource sell-
ers pay-offs
- Decentralized models [Buyya et al., 2000a]
Bargaining
- resource brokers bargain with
resource providers for lower
access price and higher usage
duration
- minimizing the cost of the
resource utilization
- All hierarchical models [Regev et al., 1998]
- the negotiation is guided by
user requirements (e.g., dead-
line)
- maximizing the resource sell-
ers pay-offs
- Decentralized models [Subrata, et al., 2010]
scheme must be enforced in the system. A recent study on
the bargaining cooperative game application in optimizing
the energy consumption in Grid is proposed in [Subrata,
et al., 2010].
IV. GAME-THEORETICAL MODELS AND HEURISTIC
APPROACHES
A. Heuristic approaches
Due to multi-constraints and different optimization criteria
in a dynamic environment, scheduling in Grids still remains
a challenging, very complex and computationally hard global
optimization problem. Thus, the heuristic approaches are
candidates for effectively designing Grid schedulers. Meta-
heuristic scheduler could achieve robustness and are ap-
propriate for tackling the various scheduling attributes, like
immediate and batch scheduling, multi-objectivity, decen-
tralized and hierarchical Grid architectures, etc.
The heuristic methods are usually classified into three
main groups, namely calculus-based (greedy algorithms and
ad-Hoc methods), stochastic (guided and non-guided meth-
ods) and enumerative methods (dynamic programming and
branch-and-bound algorithm). The most popular and effi-
cient methods in Grid scheduling are ad-hoc, local search-
based and population-based methods. We briefly review
them in Table II.
Another important feature of meta-heuristics, which is
useful in Grid scheduling, is that they can be easily hy-
bridized with other approaches. It makes the Grid schedulers
better adapted to the various Grid types and specific types of
applications. Abraham et al. [Abraham et al., 2000] present
a model for hybridization of GA, SA and TS heuristics;
each GA-based hybrid, namely GA+SA and GA+TS im-
proves the efficiency of the genetic scheduler. Ritchie and
Levine [Ritchie, and Levine, 2003] combine an ACO with
a TS algorithm for the problem.
B. Hybridization of Game Models and Heuristic-based Ap-
proaches
As Grid scheduling problem is multi-objective in its
general formulation, meta-heuristic algorithms must deal
with various conflicting optimization criteria at the same
time. Certainly, this could increase their computation cost.
For example, classical GA-based schedulers usually do not
consider in the same time many QoS constraints of concur-
rent users such as budget and job deadlines. Thus, an single
objective is usually defined as a weighted function aggregat-
ing just two main schedulers performance metrics, namely
makespan and flowtime. Of course it does not cope with
other more complex scheduling scenarios, where additional
users’ and service providers’ requirements, such as security
and reliability of the resources, have to be considered.
To overcome such limitations, the modified versions of
classical meta-heuristics, like Multi-Objective Genetic Algo-
rithm (MOGA), have been proposed. The other approaches
addressed for multi-objective problems, which has recently
attracted researchers’ attention in the literature, are based on
the idea of using game models for scheduling problems in
combination with different meta-heuristics for solving the
resulting games.
An application of modified heuristic methods in the non-
cooperative game of Grid users in the commodity market
model is presented in [Garg et al., 2009]. The authors
define two heuristics, namely Min-Min Cost Time Trade-off
(MinCTT) and Max-Min Cost Time Trade-off (Max-CTT)
algorithms, for optimizing jointly cost and execution time of
user application in Utility Grids. Both methods are based on
the framework of Min-Min and Max-Min methods, which
were adapted to the ‘user application/time slot’ pairs. This
approach is an example of the Grid users’ game, in which
the task execution and resource utilization costs are defined
as the bi-objective players’ cost functions.
In [Song et al., 2006] the authors considered the risky and
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Table II
SELECTED HEURISTIC AND META-HEURISTIC METHODS IN GRID SCHEDULING
Meta-heuristic class Class characteristic Scheduler type Methods Main references
Ad-hoc
- used in single-objective optimiz.
Immediate mode
Minimum Completion Time (MCT)
- low computational cost Minimum Execution Time [Braun et al., 2001]
Opportunistic Load Balancing
- useful in generating the initial
Batch mode
Min-Min, Max-Min, Sufferage [Xhafa et al., 2007]
solutions for population-based
schedulers
Relative Cost, LJFR-SJFR
Local search
- explore the solution space Hill Climbing [Yarkham et al., 2002]
starting from an initial solution Simulated Annealing [Abraham et al., 2000]
- construct a path in solution space Tabu Search [Xhafa, et al., 2009a]
Population-based
- explore of the search space
Single population
Genetic Algorithms (GAs) [Abraham et al., 2000]
by the populations of individuals Memetic Algorithms (MAs)
- require a large running time Particle Swarm Opt.(PSO) [Liu et al., 2009]
- effective in finding Ant Colony Optimization (ACO)
near-optimal solutions Multi-population Hierarchic Genetic Strategy(HGS)
[Kołodziej et al., 2009]
Grid-Enabled Hierarchical [Lim et al., 2007]
Parallel Genetic Algorithm (GE-
HPGA)
insecure conditions in online scheduling in Grids caused by
software vulnerability and distrusted resources. They applied
a game-theoretical model introduced in [Kwok et al., 2007]
for defining the resource owners selfish behavior in the
hierarchical Grid structure. A Space Time Genetic Algorithm
(STGA) was implemented as main mechanism of three risk-
resilient meta-heuristics, named as risky, preemptive and
replicated STG algorithms.
The results presented in [Song et al., 2006] were extended
by Wu et al. in [Wu et. al, 2010] by considering the
heterogeneity of fault-tolerance mechanism in a security-
assured Grid job scheduling. The authors defined four types
of GA-based online schedulers for the simulation of some
fault-tolerance mechanisms, including job retry, job migra-
tion (with and without checkpointing) and job replication
mechanisms.
It can be observed that many scheduling and resource
management criteria, like security and resource utilization
and reliability, are addressed separately in most of current
approaches, while, because of the complex nature of Grid
systems, it is necessary to integrate all those features into
the Grid schedulers. Thus, we defined in our recent work
[Kołodziej et al., 2010] a non-cooperative Grid users’ game
model for addressing the requirements for the security and
resource reliability in Grid scheduling. A simple case study
on Stackelberg asymmetric game approach is presented in
the following section.
V. A CASE STUDY: NON-COOPERATIVE ASYMMETRIC
GRID USERS’ GAME FOR INDEPENDENT BATCH
SCHEDULING
To meet additional scheduling requirements, like security
and resource reliability, we adapt a general concept of the
Meta-broker, which is in our approaches responsible for
checking the security condition and the resource availability.
The scheduling problem has been translated into the non-
cooperative game of Grid users. This game model takes
into account the realistic feature that Grid users usually act
independently.
In this case study we define the asymmetric Stackelberg
game for modelling the users behavior, in which one user
acts as a Leader and the rest of players (users) are his
Followers. The definition of the Leader in this game arises
naturally in the situation where a user has the full access to
the resources as opposed to the other users having the limited
access. The game is defined for solving the independent
scheduling problem, in which tasks are proceeded in the
batch mode. The Leader in our approach is the owner of a
large portion of the tasks in the batch.
Game scenario: Formally the Stackelberg game for
the Grid users can be defined as as two-level game in the
following way:
• Leader’s Level: Leader’s action I - Leader chooses
his initial strategy. His strategy vector x̂1 =
[x̂1, . . . , x̂k1 ] represents Leader’s initial action, and k1
denotes the number of tasks submitted by the Leader.
• Followers’ Level: Followers’ action - Each Follower
minimizes his cost function relative to the Leader’s
strategy:⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
x2F = argminx2∈J2 {Q2(x̂1, x2, . . . , xN )}
.
.
.
xNF = argminxN∈JN {QN (x̂1, . . . , xN )}
(1)
where {J1, . . . , JN}; l = 1, . . . , N are the sets of
strategies of the users (N is the number of play-
ers), and {Q1, . . . , QN};Ql : J1 × . . . × JN →
R
+;∀l = 1, . . . , N is the set of users’ game cost func-
tions. We assume that J1 is the set of the Leader’s
strategies. Let us denote by xF = [x̂1, x2F , . . . , xNF ]
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the vector which is interpreted as the result of the
Followers’ action.
• Leader’s Level: Leader’s action II - Leader updates
his strategy by minimizing his cost function Ql tak-
ing into account the result of Followers’ action. The
following vector xG = [xL, x2F , . . . , xNF ], where:
xL = arg min
x1∈J1
Q(x1, x2F , . . . , x
N
F ) (2)
is a solution of the whole game.
It has to be noted that the Followers play an ”ordinary”
non-cooperative game, but they must know the Leader’s
action first. An optimal solution of the whole game is called
Stackelberg Equilibrium.
The players cost functions are composed of the following
two factors:
Ql = Q
(s)
l + Q
(ab)
l , (3)
where: Q(s)l indicates the cost of security-assured allocation
of the user tasks, Q(ab)l is the cost of possible abortion of
the user’s task due the resource unavailability, and denotes
a resource utilization cost.
The values of the function Q(s)l depend on the scheduling
strategy. We consider in this work two scheduling strategies:
• risky mode - in which all risky and failing conditions
are ignored by the users. In this case Q(s)l = 0, l =
1, . . . , N .
• secure mode - in which Q(s)l function is defined as
follows:
Q
(s)
l =
(k1+...+kl)∑
j=(k1+...+kl−1+1)
Pf [j][xj ] · ETC[j][xj ]
(ETC)m(l) · kl , (4)
where ETC[j][xj ] is an element of the matrix ETC
and (ETC)m(l) is the (expected) maximal computation
time of the tasks of the user l in a given schedule.
We denoted by Pf [j][xj ] in Eq. 4 the probability of the
failure of machine xj during the execution of task j. This
probability is usually modelled by the negative exponential
distribution:
Pf [j][xj ] =
{
0 , sdj ≤ tlxj
1− e−λ(sdj−tlxj ) , sdj > tlxj
(5)
where λ is interpreted as a failure coefficient and is a global
parameter of the model, and sdj and tlxj are the elements
of security demand SD and trust level TL vectors ( [Song
et al., 2006]).
The cost of user’s tasks abortion Q(ab)l is defined using
the following formulae:
Q
(ab)
l =
∑(k1+...+kl)
j=(k1+...+kl+1)
Pab(j) · ETC[j][xj ]
(ETC)m(l) · kl , (6)
where Pab(j) is a task abortion probability, which is calcu-
lated as Pab(j) = (1−Pxj ), where Pxj denotes a reliability
probability specified for a given machine xj .
The aim of playing the game is the minimization of the
joint cost function, which is defined as follows:
Q = Q1(x1, x2F , . . . , x
N
F ), (7)
where x1 denotes the vector of Leader’s decision variables
and x2F , . . . , xNF are interpreted as the results of the mini-
mization of the Followers’ cost functions. This function must
be minimized at both Leader’s and Followers’ levels.
GA-based hybrid schedulers: For solving the game we
defined the genetic-based hybrid meta-heuristic, which com-
bines GAs and a modified version of Minimum Completion
Time method, namely PMCT algorithm. Each component of
the hybrid, i.e. GA and PMCT, operates as a scheduler at the
global (Leader’s) and Followers’ levels, respectively. Each
player (including Leader) operates just on his own decision
variables. In the initialization process Leader defines an
initial population for the GA-based global scheduler, which
contains just the values of the Leader’s decision variables.
All those “incomplete” chromosomes are sent to the Follow-
ers.
At the Followers’ level we implemented PMCT algorithm,
which is a modification of Minimum Completion Time
(MCT), which is applied to the tasks of the individual Fol-
lowers separately. Firstly, any incomplete schedule received
from the Leader’s module is scanned and the completion
times of the machines are computed. Then MCT procedure,
restricted to just the tasks of a given Follower, is executed.
The process is repeated (sequentially for all Followers)
for all schedules (chromosomes) received from the GA-
scheduler.
Experimental analysis: In the experimental evaluation
of the proposed models we considered two scenarios: risky
and secure mode. We then consider two hybrid metaheuris-
tics: Secure GA-PMCT and Risky GA-PMCT. For this
we integrated the schedulers with the discrete event-based
Grid simulator HyperSim-G [Xhafa et. al., 2009b]. The
experiments were conducted on two benchmarks composed
by a set of static and dynamic instances. In both static
and dynamic cases four Grid size scenarios are considered:
small (32 hosts/512 tasks), medium (64 hosts/1024 tasks),
large (128 hosts/2048 tasks), and very large (256 hosts/4096
tasks). The settings for the simulator are presented in Ta-
ble III.
We set the number of evolution steps for the GA at
Leader’s level to 2000, the population size to 68 the
crossover and mutation probabilities to 0.9 and 0.2 respec-
tively. There are 15 Followers in our game and the number
of the Leader’s tasks is a half of the whole task batch. The
coefficients of SD, TL vectors and the machines reliability
probabilities Pxj are defined as the uniformly generated
fractions in the ranges [0.6;0.9], [0.3;1] and [0.85;1] respec-
tively. The value of failure coefficient λ is 3.
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Table III
SETTING FOR THE GRID SIMULATOR FOR STATIC AND DYNAMIC CASES
Static setting
Small Medium Large Very Large
Nb. of hosts 32 64 128 256
Resource cap. (in MIPS) N(1000, 175)
Total nb. of tasks 512 1024 2048 4096
Workload of tasks N(250000000, 43750000)
Dynamic setting
Init. hosts 32 64 128 256
Max. hosts 37 70 135 264
Min. hosts 27 58 121 248
Resource cap. (in MIPS) N(1000, 175)
Add host N(625000, 93750) N(562500, 84375) N(500000, 75000) N(437500, 65625)
Delete host N(625000, 93750)
Total tasks 512 1024 2048 4096
Init. tasks 384 768 1536 3072
Workload N(250000000, 43750000)
Interarrival E(7812.5) E(3906.25) E(1953.125) E(976.5625)
To evaluate the scheduling performance we used
makespan and flowtime metrics (see [Xhafa et al., 2010]).
Each experiment was repeated 30 times under the same
configuration and the averaged results are presented in
Fig. 2.
The obtained results suggest that it is worth for the Grid
users to pay some additional cost of the verification of the
security conditions and possible task abortion in order to
achieve an efficient allocation of tasks to the trustful and
reliable resources.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have addressed the need of using new
computational paradigms to solve efficiently the scheduling
and resource allocation problems in Computational Grids.
By surveying most important approaches in the literature for
the problem, we observed that the proposed approaches fail
to effectively cast additional requirements of Grid schedul-
ing such as security and reliability of resources. Also, in
Computational Grids different user behaviors are present
such as symmetric, asymmetric, selfish, etc. Game-theoretic
approaches have shown to be effective to translate such
requirements and behaviors into the computational model for
Grid scheduling. We have presented some recent findings on
the use of game-theoretic for modelling allocation problems
and their resolution using meta-heuristic methods. In the
case study the Stackelberg game is implemented for the
asymmetric user’s behavior and it is solved by using the
hybrid heuristic methods. The implemented approach has
been tested using a Grid simulator showing the efficiency of
the hybridization of heuristic-based approaches with game
models, which enables to include more requirements and
features into the computational models and tackle more
effectively the resolution of the applied schedulers.
REFERENCES
[Abraham et al., 2000] Abraham, A., Buyya, R., and Nath B.:
“Natures heuristics for scheduling jobs on computational
grids”, Proc. of the 8th IEEE ACC, India, 2000.
[Ali et al., 2000] Ali, S., Siegel, H.J., Maheswaran, M., and Hens-
gen, D.: “Task execution time modeling for heterogeneous
computing systems”, Proceedings of Heterogeneous Comput-
ing Workshop, pp. 185–199, 2000.
[Braun et al., 2001] Braun, T.D., Siegel, H.J., Beck, N., Boloni,
L.L., Maheswaran, M., Reuther, A.I., Robertson, J.P., Theys,
M.D., Yao, B., Hensgen, D., and Freund, R.F.: “A comparison
of eleven static heuristics for mapping a class of indepen-
dent tasks onto heterogeneous distributed computing systems”,
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, 61(6): 810-
837, 2001.
[Buyya et al. 2002] Buyya, R., Abramson, D., Giddy, J., and
Stockinger,H.: “Economic Models for Resource Management
and Scheduling in Grid Computing”, Journal of Concurrency
and Computation: Practice and Experience (CCPE), Wiley
Press, USA, May 2002.
[Buyya et al., 2000a] Buyya, R., Abramson, D. and Giddy, J.:
“An Economy Driven Resource Management Architecture for
Global Computational Power Grids”,Proceedings of PDPTA
2000, Las Vegas, USA, 26-29 June 2000.
[Buyya, 2009] Buyya, R., and Bubendorfer, K. (Eds.): “Market
Oriented Grid and Utility Computing”, Wiley Press, USA,
2009.
[Garg et al., 2009] Garg, S.K., Buyya, R., and Segel, H.J.:
“Scheduling Parallel Aplications on Utility Grids: Time and
Cost Trade-off Management”, In Proc. of the 32nd ACSC,
Wellington, Australia, 2009, CRPIT, Vol. 91, Bernard Mans
Ed.
[Ghosh et al., 2004] Ghosh, P., Roy, N., Basu, K., and Das, S.K.:
“A Game Theory based Pricing Strategy for Job Allocation in
Mobile Grids”, Proc. of the 18th IEEE International Parallel
and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS 04), Santa Fe,
New Mexico, 2004.
[Kołodziej et al., 2009] Kołodziej, J., Xhafa, F., Kolanko, Ł.: “Hi-
erarchic Genetic Scheduler of Independent Jobs in Computa-
tional Grid Environment”, Proc. of 23rd ECMS, Madrid, 9-
12.06.2009, in J. Otamendi, A. Bargieła, J.L. Montes and L.M.
Doncel Pedrera eds., IEEE Press, Dudweiler, Germany, 2009,
pp. 108–115.
241
Figure 2. Experimental results achieved by four hybrid schedulers: in static case - (a) average makespan, (b) average flowtime ; in dynamic case - (c)
average makespan, (d) average flowtime.
[Kołodziej et al., 2010] Kołodziej, J. and Xhafa, F.: “A Game-
Theoretic and Hybrid Genetic meta-heuristic Model for
Security-Assured Scheduling of Independent Jobs in Computa-
tional Grids”, Proc. of CISIS 2010, IEEE Press, , USA, 2010,
pp. 93–100.
[Kwok et al., 2007] Kwok,Y.-K., Hwang, K. and Song, S.: “Self-
ish Grids: Game-Theoretic Modeling and NAS/PSA Bench-
mark Evaluation”, IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Dis-
tributing Systems, Vol. 18 No. 5, 1-16, 2007.
[Lim et al., 2007] Lim, D., Ong, Y.-S., Jin, Y.: “Efficient Hierar-
chical Parallel Genetic Algorithms Using Grid Computing”,
Future Generation Computer Ssytem, 23(4): 658–670, 2007.
[Liu et al., 2009] Liu, H., Abraham, A., and Hassanien, A.E.:
“Scheduling jobs on computational grids using a fuzzy particle
swarm optimization algorithm”, Future Generation Computer
Ssytem,doi:10.1016/j.future.2009.05.022.
[Regev et al., 1998] O. Regev and N. Nisan: “The POPCORN
Market - an Online Market for Computational Resources”, ICE
1998
[Ritchie, and Levine, 2003] Ritchie, G., and Levine J.: “A fast
effective local search for scheduling independent jobs in
heterogeneous computing environments”,TechRep, Centre for
Intelligent Systems and Their Applications, University of Ed-
inburgh, 2003.
[Song et al., 2006] Song, S., Hwang, K., and Kwok, Y-K.: “Risk-
resilient Heuristics and Genetic Algorithms for Security- As-
sured Grid Job Scheduling, IEEE Transactions on Computers,
vol. 55 no 6, pp. 703-719, 2006
[Subrata, et al., 2010] Subrata, R., Zomaya, A. Y., and Landfeldt,
B.: “Cooperative power-aware scheduling in grid computing
environments”, J. Parallel Distrib. Comput., 70 (2010) 84–91.
[Wolski et al., 2001] Wolski, R., Plank, J. S., Bryan, T. and Bre-
vik, J.: “G-Commerce: Market Formulations Controlling Re-
source Allocation on the Computational Grid”’ Proc. IPDPS,
2001.
[Wu et. al, 2010] Wu, C.-C., and Sun, R.-Y.: “An integrated
security-aware job scheduling strategy for large-scale computa-
tional grids”, Future Generation Computer Systems, 26 (2010),
pp. 198–206.
[Xhafa et al., 2007] Xhafa, F., Barolli, L. and Durresi, A.: “Batch
Mode Schedulers for Grid Systems”, International Journal of
Web and Grid Services, 3(1): 19–37, 2007.
[Xhafa et. al., 2009b] Xhafa, F., and Carretero, J.: “Experimen-
tal Study of GA-Based Schedulers in Dynamic Distributed
Computing Environments”, Chapter 24, In Alba et al. Eds.
Optimization Techniques for Solving Complex Problems, Wiley,
2009.
[Xhafa, et al., 2009a] Xhafa, F., Carretero, J., Alba, E., and Dor-
ronsoro, B.: “Tabu Search Algorithm for Scheduling Indepen-
dent Jobs in Computational Grids”, Computer And Informatics
Journal,special issue on “Intelligent Computational Methods”,
J.Burguillo-Rial, J.Kołodziej and L. Nolle eds., Vol. 28, No 2,
2009, pp 237–249.
[Xhafa et al., 2010] Xhafa, F., Abraham, A.: “Computational
models and heuristic methods for Grid scheduling problems”,
Future Generation Computer Systems, 26 (2010), pp. 608–621.
[Yarkham et al., 2002] Yarkhan, A., and Dongarra, J.: “Experi-
ments with scheduling using simulated annealing in a grid
environment”, Proc. of the 3rd International Workshop on Grid
Computing, pp. 232–242, 2002.
242
